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Abstract
Colombia experienced a deep recession in 1999-2003. Growth slowed by 4.2%,
and investment by 34.6%. Was the severity of the recession due to a ¯nan-
cial accelerator mechanism µ a la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)? To
answer this question, this paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with credit-market imperfections for the Colombian economy using
Bayesian methods. The results show that balance-sheet e®ects played an im-
portant role in explaining recent Colombian recession; the ¯nancial accelerator
mechanism turns out to be quantitatively signi¯cant accounting for about 50
percent of the total reduction in output after a monetary policy tightening.
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Resumen
Durante 1999-2003 Colombia experiment¶ o una profunda recesi¶ on. El producto
cay¶ o un 4.2% y la inversi¶ on cay¶ o a¶ un m¶ as, 34.6%. La severidad de la recesi¶ on
puede ser explicada por un mecanismo de acelerador ¯nanciero como el desarrol-
lado por Bernanke, Gertler y Gilchrist (1999)? Para responder esta pregunta, en
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1con imperfecciones en el mercado de cr¶ edito para la econom¶ ³a colombiana uti-
lizando m¶ etodos Bayesianos. El principal resultado es que los efectos de hoja
de balance juegan un papel importante en la explicaci¶ on del ciclo econ¶ omico en
Colombia.
Palabras claves: Modelos de Equlibrio General, Acelerador Financiero, Esti-
maci¶ on Bayesiana.1 Introduction
The Colombian economy has experienced a series of large °uctuations since 1980. The
recession at the end of the 1990s was particularly long and severe; output fell 4.2%
in 1999 and it took about 4 years to recover to its average growth rate. One of the
explanations that has been put forward to explain why the recession was so severe was
the poor state of the ¯nancial balance sheets of households and ¯rms during the years
previous to the crisis; see Chang and Velasco (1998). The beginnings of the 1990s
were characterized by a boom in investment, output, and credit. During the years
previous to the build up of the crisis, Colombian debt increased fourfold re°ecting a
greater con¯dence about future pro¯tability and an easier access to credit following a
¯nancial and commercial liberalization. Property and equity prices increased during the
spending spiral. But when they reversed during the recession, the ¯nancial positions of
households and ¯rms were suddenly exposed.
Fixed investment was especially volatile during the 1990s. Many macroeconomic
models explaining investment assume perfect capital markets. Therefore, that the
Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: ¯nancing decisions have no impact on real economic
activity, and investment is determined by expected future business pro¯tability and the
cost of capital. However, many empirical studies suggest that ¯nancial factors such as
balance sheet conditions also in°uence investment expenditures to some extent (Hall,
2001). Balance sheets models emphasize how companies will often prefer to use internal
funds rather than external borrowing to ¯nance investment because external borrow-
ing is more costly than internal ¯nance. External borrowing incorporates an external
¯nance premium because external lenders cannot perfectly observe and/or control the
risk involved in supplying funds to borrowers, a costly state veri¯cation problem, and
therefore require compensation for expected losses. According to this view, credit mar-
ket imperfections can amplify initial shocks to that economy. Changes in credit market
conditions such as asset prices and debt burdens are not simply passive re°ections of
the real activity but explain the amplitude and duration of the business cycle.
In this paper we develop and estimate a model that takes into account ¯nancial mar-
ket imperfections in order to quantify the importance of this channel in the propagation
of shocks in the Colombian economy during the period 1980-2005. The model is based
on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG hereafter) and Dib and Christensen
(2006). A micro ¯nancial contracting problem between ¯rms (borrowers) and ¯nancial
1intermediaries (lenders) is set into a macroeconomic Dynamic New Keynesian frame-
work (DNK) with sticky prices. The model distinguishes households and entrepreneurs
in order to explicitly motivate lending and borrowing. In addition, there are retailers
who set the ¯nal price of output goods, capital producers who transform output goods
into capital goods, and a government which conducts monetary policy. The only source
of economic °uctuations comes from unanticipated shocks: technology shocks, demand
shocks (to preferences, investment and money demand shocks), and monetary policy
shocks. The model incorporates credit-market imperfections through the assumption
that external funds and internal funds are not perfect substitutes; the external ¯nance
premium depends inversely on the value of entrepreneurs own net worth. As noted
by Fukunaga (2002), procyclical movements in entrepreneur's net worth caused by
unanticipated shocks then lead to countercyclical movements in the external ¯nance
premium, and thus make investment volatile. This mechanism is called the \¯nancial
accelerator". Dib and Christensen (2006), on the other hand, introduce money in the
utility function of households and estimate the model using investment data. This is
important in this context, since we are interested in the interaction of the price of cap-
ital, ¯nancing cost, and investment. Dib and Christensen (2006) estimate the model
by maximum-likelihood for the United States economy during the period 1979-2004,
and ¯nd that there is evidence of a ¯nancial accelerator mechanism. We estimated the
model for the Colombian economy using Bayesian methods for the period 1980-2005.
The results show that balance-sheet e®ects also play an important role in explaining
recent Colombian business cycles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews what happened
to real economic activity and ¯nancial conditions during recent recession in Colombia.
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 reports on our implementation of Bayesian
inference methods. Section 5 presents the results on estimates. Section 6 concludes.
2 Investment and ¯nancial conditions during the
Colombian business cycle
The depth and duration of Colombian recession of the late 1990s was not predicted by
most economic analysts. In the search for explanations, the great weakness in ¯nancial
conditions of households and ¯rms was often identi¯ed as a likely exacerbating factor.
2This is particularly true in the case of the behavior of investment. In this section we
explore this hypothesis by reviewing historical evidence on real activity and ¯nancial
conditions in recent recessions.
Figure 1 describes the behavior of real GDP during the last three decades. There
has been two severe recessions, the ¯rst in 1982 and the second in 1999. These business
cycles were accompanied by similar cycles in asset prices1 which help to determine
households and ¯rm's ¯nancial conditions.
Interestingly, the performance of investment is somehow di®erent in years previous
to the two recessions. During the economic recession at the end of the 1990s, private
investment fell unusually sharply in relation to previous recessions and to its standard
explanatory factors (user cost and ¯rm's pro¯ts). In the years before 1982, investment
did not grow as much as it did during the 1990s, and also did not fall as much during
the downturn, see Figure 2. The traditional explanation for this behavior of investment
would be that the sharp fall in investment in the late 1990s re°ected a particularly
weak output growth or a high cost of capital. However as noted above, the variations
in GDP were quite similar during the two recessions. It is not easy to measure the real
cost of ¯nance for Colombia but we can obtain some approximation based on the ratio
of gross operating surplus relative to net ¯nancial liabilities which we plot in Figure
3. This measure suggests that during the years previous to the 1999 crisis, the cost of
¯nance was lower than in the early 1980s. Therefore, the cost of ¯nance was not the
main explanation for weaker investment in the late 1990s.
1Asset prices correspond to a weighted average of equity prices and real estate prices
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Given that standard explanations of investment cannot fully explain the patterns over
this period, could ¯nancial imperfections account for the unusual weakness of invest-
ment in the late 1990s compared with the early 1980s? Figure 4 reports the high
4level of debt that the economy was facing in the years previous to the 1999 recession.
Credit was much higher during the 1990s than during the 1980s leaving the Colombian
economy in a vulnerable position before the second recession. Con¯dence about future
pro¯tability and greater credit availability due to ¯nancial liberalization contributed
to an increasing level of debt of households and ¯rms, which made them the more
vulnerable to interest rate changes. Another indicator of ¯nancial conditions that is
worth noting is capital gearing, as measured by debt relative to physical capital. This
also shows that balance sheet positions were less favorable in the years previous to the
1999 recession than in the years preceding 1982, see Figure 5. Similarly, interest pay-
ments were a greater burden on Colombian income entering the 1999 recession. Income
gearing (interest payments as a share of income) was almost twice as high in the years
previous to the 1999 recession than in the previous downturn (see Figure 6), re°ecting
both weaker income and greater indebtedness. The behavior of asset prices was not
favorable either. Since 1996 they started to decline and that weakness persisted until
2003. This was true for both property and equity prices. These asset price reductions
lowered the collateral available to back household and corporate borrowing.
In summary, the sharp slowdown in investment went hand in hand with a deterio-
ration in the ¯nancial conditions of households and ¯rms, higher interest payments on
debts and abrupt falls in asset prices, specially when we compare the second recession
to the ¯rst.
3 The Model
The model we estimate to quantify this hypothesis is based on BGG and Dib and
Christensen (2006). A micro ¯nancial contracting problem between ¯rms (borrowers)
and ¯nancial intermediaries (lenders) is set into a macroeconomic dynamic New Keyne-
sian framework with sticky prices. In a ¯rst stage we describe the ¯nancial accelerator
mechanism developed by BGG.
3.1 Financial Accelerator Mechanism
The ¯nancial accelerator explains how credit-market imperfections help to propagate
and magnify initial shocks to the economy. First we model the capital-purchasing
decisions of entrepreneurs. At this level, there are also external capital producing ¯rms
5and ¯nancial intermediaries providing external funds. Entrepreneurs purchase capital
from capital producers. In order to ¯nance their investment, they have access to external
funds in addition to their own wealth. Capital producers, on the other hand, purchase
consumption goods and transform it into capital to sell to entrepreneurs.
3.1.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs purchase capital in each period, kt, and use it in combination with hired
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where At is an exogenous technology shock that is assumed to follow the autoregressive
process
logAt = (1 ¡ ½A)log(A) + ½Alog(At¡1) + "At (2)
where ½A 2 (0;1) , A > 0, and "At is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation ¾A
The entrepreneurs choose kt and ht to maximize pro¯ts subject to the production









where »t is real marginal cost; wt is the real wage; and rkt is the real rental rate on
capital. Entrepreneur's demand for capital is determined by comparing the expected
marginal return to holding capital with its expected marginal ¯nancial cost. The ex-
pected gross return to holding a unit of capital from t to t + 1, Etft+1 is de¯ned as
Etft+1 = Et
·




where qt is the relative price of a unit of capital which varies depending on the capital
production technology. The parameter ± represents the capital depreciation rate. The
¯rst term in the numerator, rkt+1, is the marginal productivity of capital. The second
term is the capital gain enjoyed by entrepreneurs.
6The ¯nancial cost condition for purchasing capital is the main feature of this model.
BGG assume that there exist credit market imperfections that make external ¯nance
more expensive than internal funds. Additional costs (the premium) over riskless in-
terest rate, Rt+1, are imposed on borrowers if they demand external funds. According
to BGG, lenders must pay a ¯xed \auditing cost" if they wish to observe borrower's
realized returns. This auditing cost is interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy or de-
fault. Since competitive lenders must receive an expected return to lending equal to the
opportunity cost of their funds, the borrower's expected rate of return, Etft+1, must
exceed the riskless interest rate. The default risk depends on the degree in which the
entrepreneurs depend on external funds, debt, and this leads to a relationship between







with S(1) = 1 S
0(¢) < 0 (6)
where nt is entrepreneur's own wealth. When the ratio of internal funds is low the
default risk is high and in this case the cost of borrowing rises.
The log-linearized equation for the external ¯nance premium is
ft+1 ¡ Rt+1 = ¡Ãnt+1 + Ãkt+1 + Ãqt (7)
where Ã represents the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect to a
change in the leverage position of entrepreneurs, ¡
S0(¢)
S(¢) ( nt
qtkt). The agency cost and the
external ¯nance premium vary with borrowers's ¯nancial health. Higher monitoring
costs imply a higher elasticity of the premium on external funds to a change in the
balance sheet position. Hence the higher the monitoring costs the greater will be the
volatility owing to ¯nancial market imperfections.
Finally, we need to describe the evolution of net worth of entrepreneurs. En-






receive the ex-post return ft. Net worth evolves according to





(qt¡1kt ¡ nt) (8)
The introduction of net worth as an additional state variable allows us to explain the
propagation and magni¯cations of monetary shocks (and other shocks) to real activity.
7Shocks to net worth relative to total ¯nance requirements generate endogenous changes
in agency costs and in the ¯nancial external premium charged above risk-free rates.
Furthermore, net worth may be highly sensitive to unexpected shifts in the asset prices,
specially if ¯rms are leveraged. That is, a kind of multiplier e®ect. An unanticipated
rise in asset prices raises net worth more than proportionately (decreasing external
premium) which stimulates investment and, in turn, raises assets prices even further
(as we will show below).
3.1.2 Capital producers
The price of capital is determined by a q-theory of investment. Capital producers
purchase consumption goods as a material input, it, and combine it with rented capital,
kt, to produce new capital. Following Dib and Christensen (2006), we assume that
capital producers are subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs. Their optimization
















The disturbance, xt is as in Greenwood et al. (1988), a shock to the marginal
e±ciency of investment. The ¯rst order condition is







The inclusion of adjustment costs makes the price of capital volatile, therefore asset
price volatility contributes to volatility in entrepreneurial net worth.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
kt+1 = xtit + (1 ¡ ±)kt (11)
where the marginal e±ciency of investment, xt, evolves according to:
log(xt) = ½xlog(xt¡1) + "xt (12)
where ½x 2 (0;1) is a ¯rst order autoregressive coe±cient, and "xt is a random Gaussian
8variable distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ¾x.
3.2 The complete model
We now present a conventional dynamic New Keynesian framework that completes
the economic model, adding both households and retailers. Retailers buy output from
entrepreneurs and slightly di®erentiate it at no resource cost. The di®erentiation of
output gives the retailers some market power. Households and ¯rms then purchase
CES aggregates of these retail goods. Retailers are introduced to motivate sticky prices
and we follow Calvo (1983) in introducing price inertia.
3.2.1 Households
Our treatment of consumer's preferences is standard. Instantaneous utility depends on


















+ ´log(1 ¡ ht) (13)
where ct represents consumption, Mt=pt real money balances, (1 ¡ ht) leisure. The
parameters ° and ´ are positive structural parameters that denote the constant elasticity
of substitution between consumption and real balances, and the weight on leisure in
the utility function, respectively.
The shock et is a taste or preferences shock for consumption while bt is a money-
demand shock. These shocks follow the processes
log(et) = ½elog(et¡1) + "et (14)
and
log(bt) = (1 ¡ ½b)log(b) + ½blog(bt¡1) + "bt (15)
with ½e 2 (0;1) and ½b 2 (0;1).
The representative household is assumed to maximize the expected discounted sum

















Wtht + Rt¡1Dt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Tt + ­t
pt
(17)
where Dt represents the household's nominal deposits in a ¯nancial intermediary and
Wt the nominal wage. The household receive a lump-sum transfer,Tt, from monetary
authority, as well as dividend payments, ­t, from retailers.
















































where ¸t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and mt =
Mt=pt, wt = Wt=pt, ¼t+1 = pt+1=pt are real money balances, real wages, and the gross
in°ation rate respectively.
3.2.2 Retailers
We assume that entrepreneurs sell all their output to retailers. Retailers then sell dif-
ferentiated output goods to households, capital producers, and the government sector.
Given that their output is di®erentiated, retailers have the monopolistic power to set
prices of these ¯nal output goods. Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a
fraction (1 ¡ Á) of sellers are allowed to change their prices. In particular if the ¯rm
does not adjust its price between t and t + l then the price it charges in t + l is given
by the price that was in e®ect in the preceding period indexed by steady-state gross
rate of in°ation, ¼. If the ¯rm receives a signal to optimally adjust its price it will
10chooses prices ~ pt(j) in order to maximizes its discounted expected real total pro¯t over



















where the retailer's nominal pro¯t function is
­t+l(j) = (¼~ pt(j) ¡ pt+l»t+l)yt+l(j) (24)
where »t is the real marginal cost.















1¡µ + (1 ¡ Á)~ p
1¡µ
t (26)
These equations lead to the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
^ ¼t = ¯Et^ ¼t+1 +
(1 ¡ ¯Á)(1 ¡ Á)
Á
^ »t (27)
where variables with hats are log deviations from steady-state values.
2In the monopolistic competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) this demand function is
















where yt+l(j) and pt+l(j) are the demand and price faced by each individual retailer j, respectively.
113.2.3 Monetary policy rule
To close the model, we assume, following Ireland (2003), that the central bank conducts
monetary policy by adjusting a linear combination of the short-term nominal interest
rate, Rn
t , and the money growth rate, ¹t = Mt=Mt¡1, in response to deviations of
output, yt, and in°ation, ¼t, from their steady-state values. Thus reaction function of
















where "Rt is the monetary policy shock.
4 Bayesian Estimation
In order to for of a ¯nancial accelerator mechanism in Colombia, we estimate and
compare two versions of the model. The ¯rst model is estimated assuming that there
exists a ¯nancial accelerator mechanism (FA model). The second, is a constrained
version of the model without ¯nancial rigidities, Ã = 0, that collapses to a standard
DNK model.
The log-linearized version of the model form a linear rational expectation system.
The solution takes the form of a state-space model, driven by the ¯ve exogenous shocks
et, bt, xt, At, and, "Rt. Therefore, the structural parameters can be estimated by a
Bayesian procedure using data on as many as ¯ve variables3: consumption, investment,
money real balances, the short-term nominal interest rate, and in°ation.
4.1 Methodology
We apply Bayesian techniques for several reasons. First, from a practical point of view,
the use of prior distributions over the structural parameters makes the highly non-linear
optimization algorithm more stable, this is particularly valuable when only relatively
small samples of data are available, as is the case with Colombian time series. Second,
the Bayesian approach has the advantage of facilitating comparison of models that
are non-nested and taking explicit account of all uncertainty surrounding parameter
3We use ¯ve observable variables for ¯ve exogenous shocks in order to avoid singularity problems,
see Canova (2007)
12estimates. Third, the Bayesian approach allows us to formalize prior information coming
from previous studies, and, in this way, creates a link with the previous calibration-based
literature. Finally, the potential under-identi¯cation problems, which could emerge in
DSGE models, can be reduced by the use of informative priors using a Bayesian strategy,
as in Canova (2007)
This empirical approach involves obtaining the posterior distribution of the model's
parameters based on its log-linear state-space representation. The posterior distribution
is obtained by the combination of the likelihood function for the observed data (ob-
tained from the help of a Kalman ¯lter) with the selected prior distributions for each
of the parameters of the model. If conjugacy is obtained by this combination, then
the posterior can then be analytically optimized with respect to the model parame-
ters directly, otherwise, computational tools, like Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC)
sampling, should be used.
Formally, de¯ning £ as the parameter space, we wish to estimate the model pa-
rameters, denoted by µ 2 £. Given a prior p(µ), the posterior density of the model






where L(µjY T) is the likelihood conditional on observed data, Y T. The likelihood
function is computed under the assumption of Gaussian distributed disturbances by
combining the state-space representation implied by the solution of the linear rational
expectations model and the Kalman ¯lter.
The posterior distribution is typically characterized by measures of central loca-
tion, such of the mode or the mean, and measures of dispersion, such as the standard
deviation, or as the highest posterior density (HPD).
Having applied this procedure to both models, the DSGE models are compared in
their ability to ¯t the data. Suppose we have two competing models, A and B, whose
prior distribution are p(A) and p(B), respectively. Model comparisons are based on the







where p(Y TjA) and p(Y TjB) are the marginal density of the data conditional on the
13model A or B, respectively. When competing models are assigned equal prior proba-
bilities, so that p(A) = p(B), posterior odds are equivalent to the ratio of the marginal
likelihoods. In this paper, we estimate these marginal densities using the Laplace ap-
proximation 4. As the value of the Posterior odds ratio is higher than 1, the data
information alters the prior odds in favor of A, or against A when it is lower than 1.
4.2 Data
We estimate the models using quarterly data on consumption, in°ation, interest rates,
real money balances and investment for the period 1980:1-2005:4. All of these variables
are measured as deviations from trend obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with
a smoothing parameter of 1600. Data on both consumption and investment are used,
rather than data on output alone, as this help to identify the capital adjustment cost
and capital share parameters. Consumption is measured by real personal consumption
expenditures, while investment is measured by real gross private investment. We cal-
culate real money balances by dividing the M1 money stock by the GDP de°ator and
in°ation is measured as changes in the GDP de°ator. Finally, the short-term nominal
interest rate is measured by the 90-day deposit rate. Consumption, investment, and
real money balances are all expressed in per-capita terms.
4.3 Calibration and Priors
Before estimating the models it is necessary to calibrate several parameters in the
model that remain unidenti¯ed even with data on ¯ve variables. Some are set to
match key steady-state ratios. The parameter, ´, that measures the weight of leisure in
the representative household's utility function, cannot be estimated without data on
employment, Ireland (2003). The calibrating value ´ = 1:315 implies that in steady-
state households spend about one third of their time working. The parameter, µ,
determining the steady-state markup of price over marginal cost, cannot be estimated
without data on wages; the calibrating of µ = 6 implies a steady-state markup of 20
percent, a common value used in the literature. The constant associated with money
demand, b, is set to 0:052 to ensure that the steady-state ratio of real balances to
4Laplace approximation is the logarithm of the posterior density. Second order approximations are
used to obtain posterior moments, instead of modal or ¯rst order aproximation, see Carlin and Louis
(1998)
14consumption is closed to its historical value. We set the steady-state leverage ratio equal
to 0:26, according to its empirical counterpart over our estimation sample. Finally, the
discount factor, ¯, is set equal to 0:99 and the depreciation rate, ±, is set at 0:025.
We estimate the remaining 17 parameters in the model. Table 1 summarizes our
assumptions regarding the prior distributions. Those structural parameters that are
only bounded from below are modeled using an inverse gamma distribution. In partic-
ular, for the elasticity of money demand with respect to interest rate, °, we assume an
inverse gamma distribution with mode 0.032 and two degrees of freedom. The adjust-
ment cost parameter, Â, also follows an inverse gamma distribution with mode 0.46 and
four degrees of freedom. Therefore this coe±cient can vary in a 90% con¯dence interval
between 0.11 and 1.39. This is a wide range that intends to account for the uncertainty
that we have about this parameter. For the capital share, ®, the mode is set to 0.172
with two degrees of freedom. In this case ® can vary in a range that contains the value
of 0.4 from previous evidence presented by GRECO (1999).
The probability that prices remain unchanged for the next period, Á, follows an
uniform distribution which implies a mean of 0.5, a common value in the literature. The
prior for the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect to ¯rm leverage, Ã,
follows a normal distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation of 0.15. The prior
mean for this parameter is set higher than the parameter estimate found by Dib and
Christensen (2006) for the United States because balance sheet e®ects might be higher
in emerging economies.
The prior distribution for the parameters in the interest rate rule are modeled as
normal distributions in order to allow for a more general policy rule as in Ireland (2003).
The prior mean for the in°ation feedback coe±cient in the policy rule, ½¼, is set to 1.4
based on previous work by Bernal (2002). For the other two parameters in the policy
rule, ½y and ½¹, the prior mean was set to 0.6, with standard deviation of 0.1 and
0.3, respectively. The autoregressive parameters of the stochastic shocks, ½a, ½b, ½e, ½x
should lie in the (0,1) interval range, and therefore are modeled using beta distributions.
Finally, the prior distribution for the standard deviation of the structural shocks follow
inverse gamma distributions.
15Table 1: Prior distribution for the parameters of the models
Name Range Density Mean/Mode Std/df 90% Interval
Ã R Gaussian 0.100 0.150 -0.147 0.347
° [0,1) Inv. Gamma 0.032 2.000 0.030 0.394
Â [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.466 4.300 0.110 1.395
Á [0, 1] Uniform 0.500 0.063 0.050 0.950
½¼ R Gaussian 1.400 0.500 0.578 2.222
½y R Gaussian 0.600 0.100 0.436 0.764
½¹ R Gaussian 0.600 0.300 0.107 1.093
® [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.172 2.200 0.093 1.101
½a (0, 1) Beta 0.500 0.120 0.302 0.698
½b (0, 1) Beta 0.500 0.120 0.302 0.698
½e (0, 1) Beta 0.500 0.120 0.302 0.698
½x (0, 1) Beta 0.500 0.120 0.302 0.698
¾A [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.013 2.000 0.001 0.017
¾e [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.020 2.000 0.001 0.017
¾b [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.033 2.000 0.002 0.028
¾x [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.032 2.000 0.013 0.169
¾eR [0, 1) Inv. Gamma 0.031 2.000 0.003 0.042
The mode and the degrees of freedom for the inverse gamma are presented.
5 Estimation Results
The posterior means and standard errors are calculated from the output of the Metropo-
lis algorithm and summarized in table 2.5 The plots of the prior and posterior densities
are presented in Figure 7 which give an indication of how informative the observed data
are about the structural parameters. Figure 7 suggest that the observed data provide
additional information for all parameters.
The central question of interest for the empirical analysis is whether the ¯nancial ac-
celerator mechanism helps in ¯tting the data. First we present the parameter estimates
and the posterior odds test to compare the models with (FA) and without (NoFA)
¯nancial accelerator mechanism. Next, we present some impulse response implied by
the models in order to illustrate the di®erent model dynamics implied by the ¯nancial
accelerator.
5The results are based on a total of 100000 draws and four independent chains. Brooks and Gelman





































175.1 Estimates and Test
The main result is that the posterior mean of the elasticity of the external ¯nance
premium with respect to leverage, Ã, is statistically higher than zero and equal to
0.059, see Table 2. This estimate turns out to be similar to the value calibrated by
Bernanke and Gertler (2000).
Other estimates are plausible, for both models the posterior mean of the constant
elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, °, is about 0.035
which is similar to the value estimated for the US by Ireland (2003). On the other
hand, conditional on the FA model the posterior mean of the capital adjustment cost
parameter, Â, is 0.73 while under the NoFA model the posterior mean estimate is 0.54.
These estimates are higher than the 0.25 value used by BGG. Capital adjustment costs
have an important interaction with the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism. If capital
adjustment cost are high, the price of capital will respond to shocks to a greater extent.
The price of capital has a direct e®ect on the net worth of ¯rms and the cost of external
¯nancing, as in Dib and Christensen (2006). The higher capital adjustment cost in
the FA model suggest that the FA mechanism may be helping to generate investment
volatility.
The estimates of the Calvo probability of not resetting optimally prices are 0.15 in
the FA model and 0.19 in the NoFA model. This implies an expected price duration
of about 1.2 quarters, a result that is in line with Julio and Z¶ arate (2007). For both
models the posterior mean of the capital share parameter, ® , is about 0.2, somewhat
lower than the value that is often used in calibration exercises.
In both models the estimates for the policy rule coe±cients, ½¼, ½y, and ½¹, indi-
cate that the central bank of Colombia has responded much more strongly to in°ation
deviations than to output or to money-growth °uctuations.
Finally, we use the Bayesian posterior odds ratio (equation 30) to compare the
models in their ability to ¯t the data. The prior probabilities for each model are
assumed equal to 1/2. Therefore the odds ratio test is the ratio of the marginal density
of the data. The approximations of the log data densities of each model is presented
in the last row of Table 2. The posterior odds of FA model versus NoFA model are
roughly 1 to 518 and thus strongly favors the FA model6.
6The posterior odds ratio (518) is obtained as the exponential of the di®erence of the Laplace
approximations.
18Table 2: Posterior means and standard deviations for the structural parameters
FA model. NoFA model.
Name Mean Std Mean Std
Ã 0.059 0.012
° 0.035 0.004 0.034 0.004
Â 0.730 0.170 0.545 0.112
Á 0.150 0.065 0.190 0.063
½¼ 2.291 0.382 2.355 0.411
½y 0.332 0.094 0.252 0.100
½¹ 0.496 0.114 0.495 0.125
® 0.148 0.032 0.207 0.050
½a 0.702 0.057 0.724 0.052
½b 0.428 0.068 0.437 0.068
½e 0.544 0.053 0.548 0.054
½x 0.686 0.047 0.689 0.049
¾A 0.012 0.001 0.015 0.002
¾e 0.020 0.001 0.021 0.002
¾b 0.035 0.003 0.035 0.003
¾x 0.063 0.015 0.037 0.006
¾eR 0.036 0.006 0.036 0.006
Laplace approx. 1318 1309
5.2 Impulse responses
5.2.1 With and without ¯nancial accelerator
In the previous section we established that the parameter capturing the ¯nancial accel-
erator mechanism had a positive posterior mean. How important could that be? We
now examine the responses of the whole model to the e®ects of an expansionary mone-
tary policy shock. Figure 8 shows the impulse responses with and without the ¯nancial
accelerator. In each ¯gure the dashed line designates the "baseline" impulse response
which are from a model with the same steady state as the complete model with imper-
fect credit markets, but in which the additional dynamics associated with the ¯nancial
accelerator have been "turned o®". The solid line correspond to the model that includes
the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism. In response to a monetary policy shock of a 100
basis points, the addition of credit-market frictions does not substantially a®ect the
behavior of the nominal interest rate. But its impact is important in real variables. In
particular, the response of real output is twice as strong with the ¯nancial accelerator
19Figure 8: Responses to a monetary policy shock: with and without Financial Acceler-
ator
included than without it and the response of investment is increased ¯vefold.
The mechanism is as in BGG: The unanticipated decline in the policy rate stimulates
the demand for capital, which in turn raises investment and the price of capital. The
increase in asset prices raises net worth, forcing down the ¯nance premium, which
further stimulates investment.
5.2.2 Implications of increased leverage
In a model with a ¯nancial accelerator, the impact of shocks on real activity also de-
pends on initial ¯nancial conditions. As we show in the second section of this paper,
20Figure 9: The E®ect Leverage on responses to a monetary policy shock
¯nancial conditions previous to the 1999 downturn in the Colombian economy were less
favorable than previous to the 1982 recession. Part of this phenomena is explained by
the increased credit availability due to the ¯nancial liberalization that began in the
early 1990. As a result, the steady-state leverage ratio rose over that decade leaving
the Colombian economy in a more vulnerable position. Figure 9 explores the impact
of a higher steady-state leverage ratio, 60 percent instead of 50 percent in the base-
line scenario. The ¯gure shows that an increase in leverage signi¯cantly ampli¯es the
investment cycle. These simulations suggest a rationale for a regulatory policy that
discourages excessive leverage.
216 Final Remarks
This paper estimates a dynamic general equilibrium model incorporating credit-market
imperfections using Colombian data. The estimation results support the existence of a
¯nancial accelerator mechanism that was essential in creating the strong and persistent
downturn in investment during the late 1990s. An advantage of this approach is not only
that ¯nancial e®ects are given explicit micro-foundations and respond endogenously to
developments elsewhere in the economy, but also that the econometric estimates allow
us to test the relevance of ¯nancial frictions in the explanation of Colombian business
cycle and particularly of the behavior of investment.
Using a Bayesian procedure, we estimate two versions of the model: one with and
one without the ¯nancial accelerator. The estimated value of the key parameter in the
accelerator mechanism, the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect to
¯rm leverage, is statistically signi¯cant. A posterior-odds test ¯nds an improvement in
the model's ¯t with the data when the ¯nancial accelerator is present.
This paper does not claim that ¯nancial accelerator e®ects were the single deter-
minant of investment in the 1999 recession, but rather that ¯nancial frictions helped
to magnify the e®ect of other shocks. Impulse responses from the model are able to
match the main facts faced by the Colombian economy during the 1999 recession due
to increases in interest rates: a large drop in output, investment, asset prices and net
worth. The ¯nancial accelerator mechanism turns out to be quantitatively signi¯cant
accounting for about 50 percent of the total reduction in output. Furthermore, initial
¯nancial conditions of households and ¯rms were also relevant in the explanation of the
depth and severity of the recession at the end of the 1990s. In this sense, monetary
authorities should be aware that monetary policy might have stronger e®ects in the
business cycle depending on the level of leverage of the economy.
In this paper we have considered responses to monetary shocks and the e®ects of
di®erent steady-state leverage ratios on the responses to monetary shocks only, but the
model can also be used to analyze a range of other shocks, such as to productivity.
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